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IRRITABILITY AND SENSIBILITY:
THE FORCES OF LIFE
In his Anatomie gine'rale, Bichat wrote "It is easy to see that vital properties are
reduced to sensation and motion."' Most physiologists and physicians in 1801 agreed
with him, and by referring all living activity to an ability to sense and to move, Bichat
was adopting what had become a commonplace assumption. The two properties had
been studied even in the ancient world. More importantly for our purposes, they had
been investigated anew in the seventeenth century, and they had received particular
attention in the preceding fifty years. Bichat's observations on animals had led him to
conclude that there are, in total, five vital properties or subdivisions ofsensibility and
contractility.
In the mid-seventeenth century, Francis Glisson observed the reaction of fibres in
response to a stimulus and made this capacity, known as irritability, the basis of his
theory of bodily functions. We have already observed that sensibility preoccupied
members of the Montpellier school a century later. Both Glisson and Bordeu believed
that sensibility and irritability are intimately linked together in the body in such a way
that the one always provides the signal which activates the other. Albrecht von Haller
and Robert Whytt denied that they are tied together, claiming instead that they are
distributed in various proportions in different organs and parts. That is, certain parts
demonstrated considerably more sensibility to stimuli than others, which frequently
behaved as though they possess more irritability or mobility. As we shall see, these
differences between the various investigators had to do largely with the particular
definitions they applied to the two properties. The notion ofsensibility and irritability
residing in the bodily parts provided Julien Offray de La Mettrie and Denis Diderot
with the ingredients they needed to state a coherent materialist theory ofliving matter
by which a soul was deemed unnecessary even to explain consciousness and ration-
ality. The prominence of these various persons in the history of science and of
medicine attests to the fact that a good deal of the progress made in physiological
theory especially during the second halfofthe eighteenth century derived directly and
indirectly from the study ofsensation and motion.
To a large extent, this investigation stood apart from the mechanist-vitalist debate.
The men who did the work in the eighteenth century nevertheless frequently declared
their allegiance to one or other metaphysical position. Whytt, for example, was an
animist though not, he insisted, a Stahlian; Haller had been a student of Boerhaave
and, understandably, he considered himself to be a mechanist. The notion that
sensibility and contractility exist in the bodily parts, however, was a particularly suit-
able one with which to defend an organicist or monist vitalism. For example, it suited
Bordeu's and Bichat's polemical purposes admirably. Like the mechanists, the
I Xavier Bichat, Anatomiegenerale appliquee a la physiologie et a la medecine, 4 vols., Paris. Brosson,
Gabon, 1801, vol. 1, pp. 99-101, 112-114. See also his Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort,
Paris, Brosson, Gabon, 1801, p. 130.
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animists believed that the body behaves in accordance with mechanical principles but
they differed over the origin or source ofthe body's motion. Bordeu and Bichat, on the
other hand, simply denied that physical and mechanical laws had anything substantial
to do with living activity. The separation of nature into organic and inorganic realms
operating under two separate and distinct sets ofscientific laws and principles were at
the root of Bichat's vitalist theory. Like the Montpellier vitalists, he argued that
organic sensibility and irritability were dominant over the universal physical
properties ofattraction and gravitation with which they coexisted.
Temkin has shown that such terms as "irritability", "irritable", "to irritate", and
"to stimulate" occur in Galenic physiology. Galen himself wrote of a discharging
mechanism in such parts as the gall bladder, stomach, intestines, urinary bladder, and
uterus. Because they possess an irritable faculty, those organs are able to discharge
their products without the intervention of the will or the consciousness.2 William
Harvey similarly used the notions of irritation and excitation in his study of the
reproductive process.3 The modern concept ofirritability, however, is normally traced
back to Francis Glisson (1598-1677), who generalized it in such a way that it came to
be seen as an active force, an unconscious biological property spread throughout all
parts ofan organism.'
In his Anatomia hepatis of 1654, Glisson considered the irritability of the gall
bladder; in the Tractatus de ventriculo et intestinis of 1678, he treated tissue reactivity
as a generalized principle, an ability of an animal fibre to contract in response to a
stimulus. In the earlier work, he linked it to the discharge ofbile from the liver to the
gall bladder and subsequently into the digestive system. At all stages, it was said to be
provoked by plenitude and its signals were mediated by the nervous fluid.5
In De ventriculo et intestinis, Glisson promoted irritability to being a property that
belongs to all the organs, or more specifically, to their component fibres. He visualized
these fibres as extremely thin structures which serve as the basic functional elements of
the muscles, tendons, nerves, and other organs. They were supposed to be round,
flexible, resistant to tearing, extensible, and, ofcourse, irritable. More than a century
later, Bichat was to assign the vital properties, including irritability, to elemental
tissues, which played much the same role in the body as Glisson's fibres. Both tissues
and fibres were seen to be living units that function by responding to irritation or
stimuli. Glisson's language, in fact, was adopted eagerly by such as Haller and the
Montpellier physicians long before Bichat's time.
2Owsei Temkin, 'The classical roots of Glisson's doctrine of irritation', Bull. Hist. Med., 1964, 38:
297-328.
3Ibid. See also Walter Pagel, 'Harvey and Glisson on irritability with a note on Van Helmont', ibid.,
1967, 41:497-514.
4In R. Milnes Walker, 'Francis Glisson', in Arthur Rook (editor), Cambridge and its contribution to
medicine, London, Wellcome Institute, 1971, pp. 35-47. Though it is commonly accepted that Glisson was
born in Dorset in 1597, Walker presents evidence that he was, in fact, born in Bristol in 1598 or 1599.
' Glisson's notion ofirritability has been discussed in many places. Among them are Charles Daremberg,
'Glisson - Theorie de l'irritabilite et de la sensibilite, Histoire des sciences midicales, 2 vols., Paris,
Bailliere, 1870, vol. 2, pp. 650-672; Eyving Bastholm, 'Francis Glisson', The history ofmusclephysiology,
trans. by W. E. Calvert, Copenhagen, Munksgaard, 1950, pp. 219-225; Walter Pagel, 'The reaction to
Aristotle in seventeenth-century biological thought', in E. Ashworth Underwood (editor), Science,
niedicine, and history, 2 vols., Oxford University Press, 1953, vol. 1, pp. 489-509; Walker, op. cit., note 4
above, Pagel, op. cit., note 3 above.
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Glisson distinguished three stages within the process ofirritation. These are percep-
tion, the fibre's reception ofan impulse; appetite, which awakens a desire on the part
of the fibres to react; and the motion or execution of a required action. The sensation
or perception of plenitude and the consequent irritation or contraction ofbodily parts
are, therefore, most intimately linked together.
Most bodily processes, of course, are automatic and unconscious, the brain and
nervous system not being involved. Considering this unperceived local activity to be
confined to the fibre, Glisson labelled it natural perception (perceptio naturalis),
claiming that it presided over the activity of the heart, stomach, intestines, glands,
and so on. He distinguished it from sensual perception (perceptio sensitiva), which
involves the brain by way of the nerves, and from animal perception (perceptio
animalis), which is conscious, deliberate, and under control ofthe will.6
As Pagel has shown, this perceptio naturalis owed much to the work of Helmont
and William Harvey. To account for the development of an egg in his 1651 work On
generation, for example, Harvey located a kind of irritability or motility in that egg
itself, describing the property as "an animal virtue ... with a principle of motion, of
transformation, of rest and of conservation." Most interestingly, he went on to say
that the nature ofthis "virtue" is such that "ifone removes all obstacles from it, it will
take the form of an animal."7 Far from living activity being somehow imposed upon
the body as the dualists would have it, Harvey assumed an embryonic plastic force
which is responsible for formation of the body and which exists prior to the conscious
soul and prior to any organs; that is, it belongs in the matter itself. Indeed, it is this
very immanence of living forces within matter, at least certain kinds ofmatter, that is
the important feature for us in the systems of Helmont, Harvey, and Glisson. These
forces are manifest whenever a particular organization occurs.8
For monists then, a basic primeval level of life in the form of natural perception
divorced from all sensation may be considered to belong to matter in general.9 As we
shall see, the basic theme ofliving forces being released from captivity by a particular
form of organization seized the imagination of the philosophe Denis Diderot. In the
meantime, however, as we have already seen, such views were eclipsed for some fifty
years by the view that matter is inert and dependent upon external forces for its
motion. Accordingly, iatromechanism and animism divorced matter from its life,
thereby separating elements that many persons had hitherto considered to be
indissolubly linked together in biological units.
The language ofirritability ofliving parts was resurrected in the 1740s. Bordeu and
Haller both built their physiological systems around it. Bordeu fused it on to animists'
arguments against iatromechanism. It was a fruitful amalgam which gave him the
means for turning his back upon the increasingly limiting dualist systems. Bordeu's
work on glandular function easily owed at least as much to that of the seventeenth-
'Francis Glisson, Tractatus de ventriculo et intestinis, London, E. F. for H. Brome, 1672, pp. 147-174.
William Harvey, Exercitationes de generatione animalium, London, Typis Du Gardianis, 1651, p. 77.
Quoted by Jacques Roger, Les sciences de la vie dans la penseefranCaise du XVIII'siecle, Paris, Colin,
1971,p. 114.
'Pagel, op. cit., note 3 above; Temkin, op. cit., note 2 above.
9 A point made by Pagel, op. cit., note 5 above.
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century monists as it did to Stahl and Sauvages.'0 The force ofsensibility, as he con-
ceived of it, had much in common with both the archeus, and with Glisson's natural
perception. As early as 1742, Bordeu had argued in his bachelor's thesis that there is a
sensibility proper to each organ and that thesoul or vital force resides in the nerves. In
his doctoral thesis one year later, he speculated that the stomach contracts because its
membrane possesses some critical force. Here in embryo werethe major themes which
evolved into his mature system ofphysiology.
Bordeu saw irritability and sensibility as being so closely linked as to be insepar-
able. In the case of salivary glands, for example, he claimed that the activities of
eating and speaking provided the irritation which awakens sensibility, which in turn
provokes the secretion ofhumour. The following quotation from the Recherchessurle
pouls demonstrates that he conflated the two properties, insisting that nerves are
essential for sensibility to exist.
Each organic part of the living body has nerves which have a sensibility ... it is the necessary result of
their constitution, oftheir position and their modification in the body or in its parts, when they are not
entirely deprived of the conditions in which life can neither be demonstrated nor exist; sensibility is of
different types, and is more or less co-mingled with mobility or contractility .... All theancient philoso-
phers and physicians thought pretty much the same .. . thestrictum ofthe systematists, the tonic motion,
fibrillatory motion, stimulus, irritation, setting on edge ofnerves, spasm, modern contractility, all this is
explained by pretty much the same idea; this is by the activity of nerves, the scope of this activity, a
virtue, a property, a particulardisposition which Glisson called irritability."
Nerves transport critical signals which activate the organs and they integrate the
actions ofthe various organs and parts. In the case ofglands, for example, they signal
the need for a particular humour: they accompany the arteries controlling the blood
flow in the region of the gland; and they carry the irritating signal which initiates the
secretory process directing glandular sphincters to accept or reject the particular parts
of the blood presented to them. While nerves act as pathways for the transmission of
directions it is each organ's particular indwelling sensibility that defines its nature and
activity. "The eye cannot endure oil which the stomach retains easily and the latter
rejects the emetic which makes practically no impression upon the eye." Each part
reacts in an active manner to its own peculiar sensibility. "The eye prepares itself to
receive light .... The ear strains itself, opens itself, finally disposes itself to receive
sound waves."'12
The best known of all work on the subject ofsensibility and irritability, however, is
that of Albrecht von Haller (1708-77). A pious and peevish man beset by self-doubts
and haunted by religious insecurities, he had a special knack of making professional
enemies. Born in Berne, he went to Leiden to study medicine under Boerhaave. Invited
in 1736 to be Professor of Medicine at the newly founded University ofGottingen, he
remained there for seventeen productive but largely unhappy years. In 1747, Haller
published the first edition ofhis Primae lineaephysiologiae, which has been described
as Europe's first medical textbook. In 1753, much to the annoyance ofGottingen, he
'0See also Elizabeth L. Haigh, 'Vitalism, the soul and sensibility; the physiology of Theophile de
Bordeu',J. Hist. Med., 1976, 31: 3041.
1" Theophile de Bordeu, 'Recherches sur le pouls', in Oeuvres completes, 2 vols., Paris, Caille et Ravier,
1818, vol. 1, pp. 420-421. Quoted by Roger, op. cit., note 7 above, p. 626.
12 Bordeu, 'Recherches anatomiques sur la position des glandes et sur leur action', in Oeuvres completes,
op. cit., note II above, vol. 1, pp. 156-165.
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gave up his teaching career and medical practice to return to Berne, where he became
a court bailiff and, in 1758, a director of a salt works. While a civil servant, he
published an eight-volume Elementa physiologiae. His decision to give up medical
practice in spite of his considerable reputation probably had to do with a revulsion
against vivisection at a time when most of his fellow experimenters appear to have
been indifferent to the bitter price exacted from animals. In any case, Haller does
not seem to have found peace ofmind, for he died an opium addict.'3
Haller confused the discussion of sensibility and irritability of the bodily parts
somewhat by insisting that the two terms ought to be defined differently from the way
in which Glisson and Bordeu had used them. He equated sensibility with conscious
feeling and irritability with observable motion. Upon examining thedistribution ofthe
properties, he found that irritability is largely a property of the muscular fibre and
sensibility is basically limited to nerves. Furthermore, he observed that the more
sensible organs generally possess relatively little irritability while the more irritable
ones have little sensibility.
Haller also discussed an automatic and unconscious tendency to self-motion which
belongs to muscle fibres. He ascribed to it properties and functions that were much
like those Bordeu had assigned to sensibility. First lines, in which Haller first
described this reactivity, opens with an important discussion of animal fibres, which
Haller believed to be the structural elements of the body. "A fibre, in general", he
wrote, "may be considered as resembling a line made of points, having a moderate
breadth; or rather as a slender cylinder." He discerned two types of fibres. One is
longitudinal and occurs in bones, tendons, ligaments, and muscles, while the other is
flatter and occurs in cellular membranes and vessels."1 Boerhaave had had a similar
concept of multitudinous small vessels serving as the basis of all the organs and
structures," and it is possible that he and Haller were finally indebted to Glisson, who
had discussed fibres before either of them. On the other hand, the general notion of
fibres as smallest structures may equally well have been but the inevitable adaptation
ofthe corpuscular philosophy that had emerged earlier in the physical sciences. In any
case, the concept permitted Haller to adapt a modified version ofGlisson's irritability
and Bordeu's sensibility to the physiology that he inherited from Boerhaave.
On the heart's apparently innate ability to move, Haller declared:
There resides in the heart a kind of impatience to stimulus .... This irritability is greater and remains
longer in the heart than in any other part ofthe body; seeing, by stimulating it, the motion ofthe heart
may be renewed at a time, when that of no other muscle can .... That motion is peculiar to the heart
itself; coming neither from the brain, nor thesoul; seeing it remains in a dead animal even when the heart
is torn out ofthe breast; neither can it, by any act ofthe will, be madeeither quicker orslower."6
He labelled this "impatience to stimulus", this "irritability" which derives from the
fibres themselves, a vis insita (resident force). It is particularly abundant in the heart
13 An excellent and perceptive account of Haller's theory and of its central role in the development of
physiology is that of Franqois Duchesneau, La physiologie des lumieres, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1982, pp.
141-234. See also Lester S. King, 'Introduction', to Albrecht von Haller, First lines ofphysiology, trans.
and ed. by William Cullen, G6ttingen, Wrisber, 1786, reprinted New York and London, Johnson Reprint
Corp., 1966, vol. 1, pp. xii-xxiii.
4 Haller, op. cit., note 13 above, vol. 1, sect. XV, pp. 9-15.
5 King, 'Introduction', op. cit., note 13 above, vol. 1, pp. xxiii-xxxii.
16 Haller, op. cit., note 13 above, vol. 1, sect. CII, pp. 59-60. The emphasis in the passage is Haller's own
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and intestines, which are observed to contract long after they are removed from the
body. It is activated by different stimuli in different parts with the result that the
bladder responds to urine, the heart to blood, and so on." He very clearly dist-
inguished this particular reactivity from that which derives from the will:
The heart and intestines, also the organs ofgeneration, aregoverned by a vis insita, and by stimuli. These
powers do not arise from the will; nor are they lessened or excited, or suppressed, or changed by the
same. No custom no art can make these organs subject to the will, which have their motions from a vis
insita; nor can it be brought about, that they should obey the commands ofthe soul, like attendants on
voluntary motion. It is so certain that motion is produced by the body alone, that wecannot even suspect
any motion to arise from a spiritual cause, besides that which we see is occasioned by the will, as stimulus
will occasion thegreatest exertions, when the mind is very unwilling.1'
Haller described yet another active but automatic force which belongs to animal
and vegetable fibres, including even the hair, feathers, membranes, and the cellular
texture. It is a very slow "contractile power", which resists the stretching ofthe fibres
and restores them to their normal size when the extending power is removed. It is
observed in cases of pregnancy, obesity, and so on. But they are dead forces, he said,
efficacious after death and not to be confused with such living forces as the vis insita,
sensibility, and irritability.'9 His description of this force was much like that which
Barthez subsequently labelled theforce de situationfixe and described as a resistance
to attempts to disrupt the organism.20 Later still, Bichat stated that a slow
extensibility and contractility are properties not oflife but oftexture.2'
The muscular power which derives from the will or the soul alone depends upon the
nerves. "For the nerve alone has feeling; this alone carries the commands of the soul;
and of these commands there is neither instinction nor perception in that part, whose
nerve is either tied or cut, or which has no nerve."22 Whereas the vis insita remains
after a nerve is cut, the willed power depends absolutely upon an intact nervous
supply. This willed contractility and the nervous sensibility were the subjects of two
papers which Haller read before the Royal Society ofGottingen in 1752. Entitled 'On
sensibility' and 'On irritability', they contributed much to Haller's considerable
reputation. They were published in many editions, each successive edition growing
longer with supplements largely added in response to various critics who took excep-
tions to Haller's conclusions. Simon Tissot, a Swiss physician and a friend of Haller,
published a French translation ofthe work in 1755. That same year, there appeared an
anonymous English translation based upon Tissot's and even using his preface.
In it, Haller made it clear at the very beginning that his concern was with conscious
and observable properties:
I call that part of the body irritable which becomes shorter upon being touched; very irritable if it con-
tracts upon a slight touch, and the contrary if by a violent touch it contracts but little. I call that a
17 Ibid., vol. 1, sects. CCCCII-CCCCIII, pp. 233-234.
18 Albrecht von Haller, 'A dissertation on the sensible and irritable parts ofanimals' (London, J. Nourse,
1755), a contemporary translation from Latin with introduction by Owsei Temkin, Bull. Hist. Med., 1936,
4: 651-699.
19 Haller, op. cit., note 13 above, vol. 1, sects. CCCXCI-CCCXCII, pp. 226-227.
20 Paul Joseph Barthez, Nouveaux elements de lascience deIlhomme, Montpellier, J. Martel aine, 1778,
pp. 68-82.
21 Bichat, op. cit., note I above, p. 130.
22 Haller, op. cit., note 13 above, vol. 1, sect. CCCCIV, p. 235.
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sensible part of the body, which upon being touched transmits the impression of it to the soul; and in
brutes, in whom the existence ofthe soul is not so clear, I call those parts sensible, the irritation ofwhich
occasions evident signs ofpain and disquiet in the animal. On the contrary, I call that insensible, which
being burnt, tore, pricked, or cut till it is destroyed, occasions no sign of pain nor convulsion, nor any
sort ofchange in the situation ofthe body.23
To determine the distribution of sensibility and irritability, Haller dissected animals
of various kinds and ages. After exposing a particular part, he waited until the animal
ceased to struggle and complain. To test for sensibility, he subjected the part in ques-
tion to a blow, to heat, alcohol, the scalpel, acids, and so on. Ifthe animal lost its tran-
quillity, began to complain, or withdrew the wounded part, Haller concluded that it
had sensibility. He found that the skin is very sensitive "for in whatever manner you
irritate it, the animal makes a noise, struggles, and gives all the marks ofpain which it
is capable of." By the time he dissected down to the fat and cellular membrane,
sensibility appeared to have vanished. Deeper still he found that muscular tissue
responds to painful stimuli but only if its nerve supply is intact. Tendons are
absolutely insensitive, for an animal in whom such an organ is lacerated, burned, or
pricked shows no sign ofpain. When it is released, provided that even a small part of
the tendon remains intact, the animal walks easily apparently with no pain.
In First lines, Haller had asserted that nerves alone carry sensibility. He stuck to
that conviction in this later work but by so doing, he was forced into certain
inconsistencies. Teeth have a nerve supply and as expected, he found them to be sensi-
tive. By the time he came to examine bones, the animal tested was in such pain that no
accurate observations were possible. Though bones are made of the same basic sub-
stance as teeth, Haller argued, they must be insensible since they have no discernible
nerve supply. Though other people had frequently observed that marrow is very
painful, Haller thought that to be improbable "as it is ofthe same nature with fat, and
has no nerves bestowed upon it." When faced with the difficulty of explaining why
such viscera as lungs, liver, spleen, and kidneys are sensitive though they possess no
nerve supply, Haller pleaded rather weakly that "I do not allege that they are void of
all sensation, but only that it is very weak in them, viz. such as one would expect in a
part which has very few nerves bestowed on it in proportion to its bulk."24
Haller found that irritability and sensibility exist in a kind ofinverse relationship in
the parts. While irritability may be mediated through a nerve, there is never any
motion in the nerve itself. While cutting or tying the nerve to a part destroys its
sensibility, it does not affect contractility. That is, parts ofthe body that are normally
subject to the will are largely paralysed if a nerve is cut, but they retain an ability to
contract in response to direct stimulation.25
23 Haller, op. cit., note 18 above, pp. 658-659.
24 Ibid., pp. 658-673.
25 Haller found that the sensible organs of the body are the skin, muscles, teeth, retina, stomach and
intestines, genitalia, heart, and nerves. Only a little sensibility is present in theglands and in internal viscera
such as the liver, spleen, kidneys, and lungs. The insensible organs are fat, cellular membranes, tendons,
periosteum, bones, marrow, dura mater and pia mater, omentum and pleura, blood vessels, cornea and iris,
and capsulae of the joints. The irritable organs are the muscles (including the heart and diaphragm),
stomach and intestines, caecum, glands, genitalia, bladder, and lacteals. The non-irritable organs are the
skin, tendons, periosteum, dura mater and pia mater, mediastinum, omentum and pleura, blood vessels,
pericardium, and nerves. This information and the description ofthe experimentation which led to the con-
clusions is presented in op. cit., note 18 above.
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This work was contemporary with Bordeu's examination of the glands. Haller
attempted to discredit this system of"M. Du Bordeu, so severe a critic ofthe writings
ofothers" when he had occasion to comment upon it. According to Haller, the glands
in general have very little sensation for they are supplied with very few nerves. He
wrote that,"there are no considerable nerves besto'd upon the largest of the glands,
nor the thymus", and "the nerves which go to the thyroid gland are a great deal
smaller than those ofa muscle ten times less in bulk than that gland."26 I suspect that
Haller was succumbing to a touch ofpetulance ifnot downrightjealousy, for Bordeu's
work was unquestionably impressive. Curiously enough, Boerhaave himself had
remarked that glands "receive a great many Nerves, more in Proportion to their Bulk,
than any other Body; and which are distributed so minutely throughout the whole
Body ofthe Gland, that they seem to occupy every individual Point."27 It may be that
Haller disliked Bordeu's conclusions because they derived from a vitalist orientation.
In any case, he disregarded his impeccably made observations and affirmed his own
faith in the mechanist viewpoint, which held that pressure upon a gland causes it to
expel its juices: saliva, for example, is squeezed out in the mouth when we are not
hungry by means ofthecompression ofthedigastric muscle.28
Bordeu responded, albeit mildly, to Haller's ciiticism in his Recherches sur
l'histoire de la medecine. Though he remarked that Haller's theory was but one of a
number on the subject of irritability, he described Haller as "one of the most dist-
inguished medical philosophers of this century". But he pointed out that the Mont-
pellier school had taken the irritability of the parts of the living body to be a general
principle before it was studied from Haller's particular viewpoint.29
Haller's most important and long-lasting argument surrounding the question ofthe
sensible and irritable parts was with Robert Whytt (1714-64), who had studied
medicine in London, Paris, and Leiden before receiving a medical doctorate from
Rheims in 1736. In 1746, he took an appointment as professor ofmedical theory in his
home town of Edinburgh, where he quickly developed a reputation as a major
physician. He became a fellow ofthe Royal Society, the first physician to the king in
Scotland and in 1763, president ofthe Royal College ofPhysicians ofEdinburgh.
Like many of his contemporaries, Whytt was interested in the larger subject of
organic motion. In 1751, he published an Essay on the vital and other involuntary
motions ofanimals, a book which is judged to be his single most important work.30
Whytt's ideas are particularly interesting insofar as he applied animist notions of life
and matter to the study ofanimal activity. Though he had gone to Leiden specifically
to hear Boerhaave, Whytt was not only not persuaded by mechanism but downright
disdainful of anyone who was. He described the idea that an inanimate machine can
26 Ibid., p. 67.
27 Herman Boerhaave, 'Of the different structure ofthe glands', Dr. Boerhaave's academical lectures on
the theory ofphysic, beingagenuine translation ofhis Institutes as dictatedto hisstudents at the University
ofLeyden, 6 vols., London, W. Innys, 1757-73, vol. 2, sect. 242, pp. 210-21 1. 26 Haller, op. cit., note 18 above, pp. 673-678.
29 Bordeu, 'Recherches surI'histoire de la m6decine', in Oeuvrescomplites, op. cit., note I I above, vol. 2,
pp. 668-669.
30 Whytt's An essay on the vital and other involuntary motions ofanimals is discussed at considerable
length by Roger French in 'Involuntary motions and the reflex', Robert Whytt, the soul, and medicine,
London, Wellcome Institute, 1969, pp. 79-92.
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produce heart movement, respiration, or intestinal motion simply by virtue of its
mechanical construction as "a notion of the animal form too low and absurd to be
embraced by any but the most minute philosophers!"'" He added that since the con-
traction ofthe heart, motion ofthe blood, and continuance oflife in general cannot be
accounted for mechanically, one must have recourse to the "energy of a living
principle capable ofgenerating motion"."
Whytt dismissed the monists as decisively as he had the mechanists, for he simply
could not admit the possibility that animal fibres possess a power ofsensation and of
generating motion unless these are united by "an active PRINCIPLE, as the
SUBJECT and CAUSE ofthese".33 He considered the soul to be the living and unify-
ing principle, insisting, however, that he was not a Stahlian. He particularly objected
to Stahl's contention that the soul acts rationally when it is directing unconscious
activity.34 He preferred to consider it to be a sentient rather than a rational principle:
The mind ... in producing the vital and other involuntary motions, does not act as a rational, but as a
sentient principle; which, without reasoning upon the matter, is as necessarily determined by an ungrate-
ful sensation or stimulus affecting the organs, to exert its power, in bringing about these motions, as is a
balance."
It is curious that while Whytt rejected the notion ofsentient matter, he felt comfort-
able in imposing a sentient principle, that is the soul, to move the inert matter. .It is a
good illustration of the tenacity of the mind-matter duatism so characteristic of the
seventeenth century. In the Essay, Whytt wrote that irritability is a power ofthe soul,
which is awakened by the sentient activity that resides in the brain and the nerves. The
muscle which is about to contract "perceives the stimulus". Thus, as with Bordeu,
irritability depends upon sensibility and is its inseparable adjunct. In turn, that
sensibility is a function ofthe central nervous system.
Haller reviewed Whytt's Essay, dismissing what he called the specious Stahlian
assumption that all motions proceed from the soul. Unconcerned about the distinc-
tions separating animists, Haller continued thereafter to group Whytt with the
Stahlians, apparently oblivious to any number ofprotests to thecontrary.36 Whytt, in
turn, reviewed Haller's work on sensibility and irritability in a 1755 treatise entitled
Observations on thesensibility and irritability oftheparts ofman andotheranimals.
He acknowledged in the introduction that these "new and curious experiments" must
henceforth produce considerable changes in the theory and practice of medicine. He
also took the opportunity to strike back at Haller's criticism of him by caustically
observing that Haller "has taken uncommon pains in making many and repeated
experiments; as much to overpower the incredulous by their number as to secure
himself from any chance of being deceived." He proceeded to challenge many of
31 Robert Whytt, An essay on the vitaland other involuntary motions ofanimals, Edinburgh, Hamilton,
Balfour & Neill, 1751, p. 2.
32 Ibid., pp. 270-271.
33 Ibid., pp. 241-242.
34 Ibid., p. 267.
35 Ibid., p. 289.
36 French, 'The soul in physiology', in op. cit., note 30 above, pp. 149-160. French discusses the develop-
ment of the notion ofthe physiological role in general as well as Whytt's particular conception ofthe soul's
activity.
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Haller's observations and conclusions concerning the reactivity of the parts. Haller
responded to these observations in the 1756 edition of On the sensible and irritable
parts ofanimals, to which Whytt replied again in a 1768 edition ofObservations.37
Whytt's major criticism of Haller's experimental technique was an elementary one,
for he simply pointed out that a great pain will dampen or destroy a lesser one. By the
time Haller had opened an animal's thorax, he wrote, the beast was suffering
excruciating pain so that the fact that it did not register additional pain when its heart
was pricked or cut did notjustify the conclusion that the heart is without feeling.38 In
general, Whytt challenged many of Haller's basic observations. He refuted Haller's
claim that the periosteum and the tendons are insensitive by pointing out that arthritis
is very painful. Haller replied that the seat of arthritic pain is in the skin or the sub-
cutaneous nerves. Neither, he added, does phrenitis occur in the dura mater or
pleurisy in the pleura, as is commonly assumed, for his own experiments had shown
that the dura mater and the pleura are devoid of feeling. Though many physicians
report that pain is experienced in the bone marrow, Haller insisted that the organ is
insensitive because it is "cellular", of the same nature as fat, and with no visible
nerves. When Whytt pointed out that many persons had been heard to complain that
the marrow of a cut arm or leg was painful to touch, Haller replied that a single
experiment was not sufficient to prove marrow sensibility.39
Haller listed the cornea, kidneys, and glands among the insensitive organs. Whytt
pointed out that one feels one's cornea when it is pressed, that a patient feels pain
when a kidney is opened in surgery, and that a blow to the testicles or breasts produces
much pain. He wrote appropriately that "One instance of this kind is more decisive
... than twenty experiments on brutes who cannot inform us whether they feel a slight
pain or none at all."40 Thus the debate proceeded with neither man acknowledging the
legitimacy of the other's observations. Whytt denied the existence of an altogether
insensitive organ or tissue, pointing out that even those parts that normally seem to be
so become painful if they are diseased or inflamed. Though Haller never conceded
much credibility to Whytt, it was largely due to peevishness. Bichat was to take up
Whytt's point by stating that a normally unconscious sensitivity becomes conscious
whenever it is augmented by disease or inflammation.
However much Haller might have objected to having his notions challenged or
developed by vitalists like Bordeu or Whytt, the trauma was as nothing compared to
that of having them linked with the ideas ofJulien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-51).
The deeply pious Haller was appalled and offended by the work of this outspoken
37This is described in considerable detail by French, 'The controversy with Haller: sense and sensibility',
ibid., pp. 63-76. French also discusses it in 'Sauvages, Whytt and the motion of the heart: aspects of
eighteenth-century animism', Clio medica, 1972, 7: 35-54. The metaphysical and theoretical differences
between the two men areperceptively discussed by Duchesneau, op. cit., note 13 above, pp. 171-234.
"I Robert Whytt, 'Observations on the sensibility and irritability of the parts of man and other animals',
in The works ofRobert Whytt, Edinburgh, T. Becker & P. A. de Hondt, 1768, pp. 251-261.
39 Haller, op. cit., note 18 above, p. 667.
40 Haller's responses to Whytt's 'Observations on sensibility and irritability' (op. cit., note 38 above) are
in his Memoiressurla naturesensible et irritabledespartiesdu corpsanimal, trans, by Simon Andre Tissot,
4 vols., Lausanne, Marc. Mic. Bousquet, 1756, vol. 4, pp. 102-134. In a 1768 edition of his work, Whytt
rcsponded in turn to Haller's responses and thus the argument continued. This is discussed by French in
'The controversy with Haller', op. cit., note 37 above pp. 68-76.
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materialist, who was widely vilified as a libertine and an atheist. La Mettrie used basic
organicist views and the notions ofsensibility and irritability to develop the thesis that
psychic or rational phenomena in man depend not upon an immaterial soul but upon
physical factors alone. By so doing, he also denied the spiritual element ofthe human
being.
La Mettrie was a native of Brittany.41 He attended the Paris Medical School for five
years but, like many students at the time, he transferred to Rheims to get his medical
doctorate at less cost. Then he went to Leiden to study with Boerhaave. He undertook
to translate and to annotate the famous physician's medical work, bringing out an
abridged translation of Boerhaave's Institutiones reimedicae shortly after Haller had
completed an edition of it in 1743. To explain muscular contraction, Boerhaave had
relied upon the traditional albeit clumsy notion of animal spirits flowing into the
muscles. Perceiving the limitations of that theory, Haller had looked for other
explanations of muscular motion, as we have seen. La Mettrie was familiar with the
work of Haller and very probably with that of other contemporaries, who had
examined the nature of muscular activity and of irritability.42 The evidence of an
organic reactivity became the theoretical tool by means of which La Mettrie gave
coherence to his thesis that life can exist apart from any sort of a soul or other vital
principle.
In 1742, La Mettrie abandoned his family and a medical practice in his native Saint
Malo to go to Paris, where he met many physicians and notablephilosophes. While
serving as an inspector ofhospitals for the armies on campaign, La Mettriecomposed
his Histoire naturelle de l'ame, wherein he argued that thought, volition, and all
purposive motions ofthe body are the products merely ofthe physical organization of
the body, a necessary consequence ofthe unique arrangement ofits parts. A decree of
the Parlement ofParis in July 1746 acknowledged the importance ofthe work by con-
demning it to the flames. La Mettrie left a hostile France for the more liberal Holland.
The following year, his most famous work, L'homme machine was published. It
appalled even the Dutch. The abuse heaped on La Mettrie reached hysterical propor-
tions, forcing him to take refuge in the court of Frederick the Great in Berlin. The
suave and worldly emperor's repulsion at his own pious Lutheran upbringing caused
him to be tolerant ofpersons whom he saw to be victims ofbigotry. Writing about La
Mettrie, he observed that "Calvinists, Catholics and Lutherans forget ... that co-
substantiation, free will, the mass for the dead and the infallibility of the pope divide
them." Like almost everything that emerged from La Mettrie's pen, L'homme
machine delivered jibes at those persons he thought were too pompous, pious, or self-
righteous. The work was pointedly antagonistic to established religion, and even
atheistic in its viewpoint; it dismissed the soul as "merely a vain term about which no
one has any idea",43 and life after death as "a chimera based upon absurd
41 Julien Offray de La Mettrie, L'homme machine, edited by Aram Vartanian, Princeton University
Press, 1960: La Mettrie's life and work are described by Vartanian in his 'Introduction', pp. 1-12. A brief
survey of La Metttrie's biological ideas is found in Thomas S. Hall, Ideas oJ lift and matter, 2 vols.,
University ofChicago Press, 1969, vol. 2, pp. 46-56.
42 Vartanian, op. cit., note41 above, pp. 84-89, discusses La Mettrie's debt to Haller.
431Ibid., p. 180.
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reasoning"." The European scholarly world recoiled in indignation.45
Today, the thesis ofL'homme machine does not strike us as being any more funda-
mentally atheistic than that of any other physiological work described herein. The
crucial point is that La Mettrie moved a logical and inevitable step beyond Bordeu,
Whytt, and Haller by extrapolating organicism to its logical monist conclusion,
maintaining that the rational and conscious processes are a part of the matter of the
body. If all living processes derive from organization, there remains no need for an
immaterial overseer. The assertion quoted aboveconcerning the "vain term" occurred
in the following context:
All the faculties ofthe soul depend on the proper organization ofthe brain and ofthe body so that they
are visibly nothing but organization . . . the soul, therefore, is merely a vain term about which no one has
any idea and for which agood intellect can only serve to name the part ofus which thinks. Given the least
principle ofmotion, animated bodies will have everything necessary for them to move, to sense, to think,
to be contrite, and in a word, to conduct themselves in the physical realm and in the moral one which
depends upon it.46
La Mettrie offered a number of relevant but common observations to demonstrate
the existence ofa motive principle in living flesh. He remarked that all animal muscle
palpitates after death; muscles separated from the body contract when they are
pricked or otherwise stimulated; intestines retain their peristaltic motion for a con-
siderable time after death or outside the body; a simple injection of warm water will
reactivate the heart or muscles and so on. He was fascinated by a remarkable little
creature called a polyp, which, superficially at least, resembles a plant more closely
than an animal. A naturalist, Abraham Trembley, had observed that any part
separated from the creature can, under certain circumstances, regenerate a complete
new polyp in a few hours. It had come to be a kind of cause celbre of the scientific
world and its regenerative capacity lent itself to a variety of interpretations. Whytt,
for example, believed that it demonstrated the presence of a ubiquitous soul in living
matter, while Barthez was confirmed in his theory of the vital principle. For La
Mettrie and for monists in general, the polyp's fascinating ability was powerful
evidence for a motive force belonging to the parts themselves. It could not help but
confirm La Mettrie in his conviction that life has nothing to do with a vital or spiritual
principle.47
Ifthe source ofintelligence and personality is but a consequence ofthe arrangement
of the parts, it follows that the differences between man and the animals are due
merely to the degree or quality oftheir respective organizations. It is conceivable, La
Mettrie wrote, that education might be able to bridge the gap between man and the
higher animals. In the Discourse on method, Descartes had emphasized the uni-
queness of human speech, claiming that it is an ability conferred by the soul. La
Mettrie, however, speculated that apes might well be capable of learning to speak.4"
Although some recent anthropologists have come to believe that such speculations
may have some foundation, in the middle ofthe eighteenth century, the suggestion of
44 Ibid., p. 196.
45 Ibid., p. 95-113. Vartanian describes the reception ofL'hommemachine here.
46Ibid.,P. 180.
47 Ibid., pp. 180-182. See also Aram Vartanian,'Trembley's polyp, La Mettrie, and eighteenth-century
French materialism',J. Hist. Ideas, 1950, 11: 259-286.
4' La Mettrie, op. cit., note41 above, pp. 161-162.
58Irritabilityandsensibility
such a possibility was deemed outrageous, which may be precisely why La Mettrie
wrote it down.
La Mettrie's man-machine has often been interpreted as an extrapolation of
Descartes' beast-machine. King, for example, wrote that "While Descartes had
regarded animals as machines, the dualistic philosophy gave to man a soul which the
animals lacked and which differentiated a human from a machine. It was only a small
step, but a mightily important one, to say that the mind of man was not a separate
substance."49 Indeed, the title which La Mettrie chose for his work and much of his
language in the text invites that interpretation. It may even be that the notion of the
beast-machine sparked the initial idea which finally produced the work. Nevertheless,
a large conceptual gulfseparates the two men, for La Mettrie utterly rejected dualism.
The machine he described is composed not of inert, brute matter but ofmaterial sub-
stance which is vibrantly alive and throbbing with activity. We read, forexample, that
"The human body is a machine which winds its own springs. It is the living image of
perpetual movement."'0 And, "Let us enter into some detail concerning the innate
activity of the human machine. All the vital, animal, natural and automatic notions
are due to its action."" Near the end ofthe work, he affirmed, "Let us conclude thus
boldly that man is a machine, and that in the whole universe there is but a single sub-
stance differently modified."'2 Therefore, though man is a machine, he is no mere
mechanism. Much as La Mettrie must have been imbued by Boerhaave with the
notion of mechanical laws governing an organism's behaviour, he was also much
indebted to investigations ofthe motive principles resident in matter itself.'3
Though La Mettrie's aggressive atheism appalled his contemporaries, they could
not help but recognize him as a prodigal intellectual relation. He maliciously pointed
out the theoretical kinship that linked their work to his own. Jerome Gaub,
Boerhaave's successor at the University of Leiden, is a case in point. A few months
before L'homme machine was completed, La Mettrie had heard Gaub read a paper,
De regimine mentis, which concerned itself with the relationship between mind and
body. Proceeding from the assumption that mental phenomena are physically
regulated, Gaub proposed the possibility ofthus understanding and hence controlling
psychic and mental phenomena. Many of his examples were then borrowed by La
Mettrie, to the consequent chagrin ofthe good Christian, sorely tried for a long time
by the apparent affinity between his notions and those of La Mettrie. In a 1763 paper,
he referred to La Mettrie's presence at the talk hedelivered sixteen years earlier:
I do indeed regret bitterly that a little Frenchman ... brought forth a repulsive offspring, to wit, his
mechanical man, not long aftersitting before this chair and hearing mespeak, and did this in such a way
49 King, op. cit., note 13 above, p. xlii.
'° La Mettrie, op. cit., note41 above, p. 154.
"Ibid., pp. 182-183.
52 Ibid., p. 197.
53 Aram Vartanian has contributed substantially to our understanding of La Mettrie's place among
eighteenth-century theorists. In his introduction to a recent critical edition of L'homme machine (op. cit.,
note 41 above, p. 36), he examined La Mettrie's intellectual links with both mechanists and monists,
pointing out that his theory was not rooted in any traditional notion ofan externally directed machine. The
irritability principle led him to a concept ofthe human machine as a self-sufficient dynamic system ofinter-
dependent parts. He labelled La Mettrie's viewpoint a "vitalo-mechanist orientation", for, far from being
an extrapolation ofthe beast-machine, the man-machine's substance throbs with indwelling vitality.
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that it seemed to many people that I had furnished him with, if not sparks for his flame, at least matter
forembellishing his monstrosity.54
The most famous conflict of all was with Haller. In his abridged translation of
Boerhaave's Institutes of medicine, La Mettrie had borrowed freely from Haller's
edition of the same work, but without acknowledging his debt. Haller charged him
with deception in a review of his Histoire naturelle de I'ame. As if to compensate for
his earlier neglect, the still obscure La Mettrie dedicated L'homme machine to Haller,
prefacing the work with an effusive tribute from "your disciple and your friend". The
dedication remained in the 1751 edition, in which La Mettrie also announced that
Haller was his inspiration and his teacher." The testy protestant was left now com-
plaining that he wished no connexion with this "impious system which my experi-
ments totally refute".5' The point is, significantly enough, that his experiments by no
means refuted La Mettrie, who was correct in seeing a relationship between their basic
notions. It was, nevertheless, a cruel game, for the prim Haller was utterly unable to
match wits with La Mettrie.
La Mettrie died at the age offifty-two, reportedly due to an excess ofa truffle pate.
His detractors interpreted his untimely end as an act of divine vengeance as if God
himselfhad intervened to refute the materialist philosophy. Today, La Mettrie's well-
placed jibes against the pompous and the pious make delightful reading. We are by
now sufficiently removed from his milieu and the passions it engendered to see that he
was correct to claim a relationship between his own work and that of Glisson and of
many contemporaries, some of whom, like Denis Diderot (1713-84), even shared
many ofhis ideas about the soul and matter, and agreed with hisdemonstration.
Neither a physician nor a naturalist himself, Diderot was much preoccupied with
54 L.J. Rather, Mind and body in eighteenth-century medicine. A study based on Jerome Gaubs De
regimine mentis, London, Wellcome Institute, 1965, pp. 115-204. Gaub's reaction to La Mettrie's work is
also described by Vartanian, op. cit., note 41 above, pp. 90-92. Vartanian quotes from a letter which Gaub
wrote to Charles Bonnet concerning that same 1747 lecture and La Mettrie's attendance at it. He said: "Des
esprits malins en tirent des consequences irreligieuses."
's La Mettrie dedicated L'homme machine to Haller with the following words: "C'est le plaisir quej'ai eu
A composer cet ouvrage, doneje veux parler; c'est moi-meme, & non mon livre queje vous addresse, pour
m'eclairer sur la nature de cette sublime Volupt6 de l'Etude. Tel est le sujet de ce Discours. Je ne serois pas
le premier Ecrivain qui, n'aient rien a dire, pour reparer le Sterilite de son Imagination, auroit pris un texte
ou il n'y en eutjamais. Dites-moi donc, Double Enfant d'Apollon, Suisse Illustre, Fracastor Moderne, vous
qui savez tout a la fois connoitre, mesurer la Nature, qui plus est la sentir, qui plus est encore i'exprimer;
savant Medecin, encore plus grand Poete, dites-moi par quels charmes l'Etude peut changer les Heures en
moments; quelle est la Nature de ces plaisirs de l'Esprit, si differents des plaisirs vulgaires .... Mais la
lecture de vos charmantes Poesies m'en a trop penetre moi-meme, pour que je n'essaie pas de dire ce
qu'elles m'ont inspire. L'homme, considere dans ce point de vue, n'a rien d'etranger a mon sujet." Op. cit.,
note 41 above, p. 143.
56 Haller voiced his personal objections to L'homme machine as follows: "The deceased M. de la Mettrie
has made Irritability the basis ofthe system which he advanced against the spirituality ofthe soul; and after
saying that Stahl and Boerhaave knew nothing ofit, he has the modesty to assume the invention to himself,
without ever having made the least experiment about it. But I am certainly informed that he learnt all he
knew about it from a young Swiss with whom I am not acquainted: who never was my pupil, not is he a
physician, but he has read my works, and seen some ofthe famous Albinus's experiments and upon these La
Mettrie built his impious system, which my experiments totally refute. For if Irritability subsists in parts
separate from the body and not subject to the command ofthe soul, ifit resides every where in the muscular
fibres and is independent ofthe nerves, which are the satellites ofthe soul, it is evident, that it has nothing in
common with the soul, and it is absolutely different from it; in a word, that neither Irritability depends upon
the soul, nor is the soul what wecall Irritability in the body." Op. cit., note 18 above, pp. 695-696.
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scientific and technological development. Indeed, he acquired a considerable
proficiency in mathematics, physics, chemistry, physiology, and a number of
languages. Acutely aware ofthe great changes which science and the modes ofthought
accompanying it were producing upon the intellectual milieu of Europe, he plunged
boldly and with considerable insight into the examination of many suggestive ideas
and their implications. Among the questions that interested him most were those
having to do with life, consciousness, and rationality.
Diderot's best-known accomplishment is the popular and vastly influential thirty-
five-volume Encyclopedie completed in 1780, after some twenty years of toil, but in
addition, he wrote extensively on a variety ofsubjects.57 For our purposes, it is instruc-
tive to examine the development of Diderot's ideas about living processes. His mature
theory, developed by 1769, was so provocative that hedared not publish it. By then, he
had come to believe that the whole universe is composed ofone single substance which
possesses sensitivity. Life, he argued much like Harvey, is not the imposition of vital
forces on to matter but a release ofsensitivity from its material prison.
In 1746, Diderot composed Pense'es philosophiques, a work preoccupied with
nature's beauty, which he took to be a witness to divinity, but not to the malevolent
Christian God whom he eschewed. His more benevolent deity was a kind of master
mechanic who oversees natural phenomena including organic processes. The Parle-
ment ofParis found the book to be unacceptable forgeneral reading and condemned it
to beburned.58
By 1749, when his Lettre sur les aveugles a l'usage de ceux qui voient appeared,
Diderot had effectively evolved into an atheist. Relating therein a fictitious conversa-
tion between a dying mathematician, Nicholas Saunderson, blind from birth, and a
Reverend Holmes, Diderot has Holmes trying to persuade Saunderson that one can
discern the existence of God in the complex mechanism of the organs, and in the
beauty and order of nature generally. Saunderson protests that this need has nothing
to do with a sovereignly intelligent being. "If it is a matter of astonishment for you,"
he asserts, "then that may possibly be because you are in the habit of treating
everything that is beyond your comprehension as a miracle." Diderot would have one
explain order without resorting to some notion ofpreliminary design. It mightjust as
well be simply the consequence ofthe chance union ofelements in an infinity ofcom-
binations. The viable ones have persisted while others have necessarily disappeared.59
While serving three months in the prison ofVincennes for writing the Lettresur les
aveugles, Diderot annotated the first three volumes of Georges-Louis Buffon's
Histoire naturelle. In an effort to distinguish between brute and living matter, Buffon
believed that there are specifically organic molecules scattered throughout nature
57 Diderot has been the subject of many biographical and philosophical studies. One of the most recent
and most satisfying is by Arthur M. Wilson, Diderot, New York, Oxford University Press, 1962. A
thorough analsyis ofthe development of Diderot's thought in relation to the life sciences and of physiology
is provided by Jacques Roger, 'Diderot et l'Encyclop6die', op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 585-682. A very brief
survey is provided by Hall, op. cit., note41 above, vol. 2, pp. 56-65.
'8 Denis Diderot, 'Pensees philosophiques', in Oeuvres compltes, 15 vol., Paris, Le Club Franqais du
Livre, 1969, vol. 1. Roger discusses the work in op. cit., note 7above, pp. 585-591.
59 Diderot, 'Lettre sur les aveugles', in Oeuvres completes, op. cit., note 58 above, vol. 2, p. 196. Roger
discusses the book in op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 591-599.
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which combine to form composite bodies. Diderot's article 'Animal' in the first
volume of the Encyclopedie expounded upon just that theme. Buffon's work also
influenced Diderot's Pens&es sur l'interpretation de la nature of 1753, in which he
speculated about the nature and origin ofliving species. Echoing Buffon, he wrote that
"matter in general is divided into dead matter and into living matter." But that raised
other questions. "How can it be", Diderot asks "that matter is not one, either all
living or all dead? Is living matter always living? And is dead matter always and really
dead? Does living matter ever die? Does dead matter ever begin to live? Is there any
assignable difference between dead and living matter other than organization?"60
Eventually these speculations were to terminate in a notion of unity which rejected as
irrelevant thedistinction between thought and matter, between life and non-life.
Not satisfied with assigning living phenomena to organization, Diderot wrote in
1759 that it is absurd to say that "particle a placed to the left ofparticle b has no con-
sciousness ofits existence, does not sense, is inert and dead", while ifb is to the left of
a, "the whole lives, knows, senses".6' By 1765, he had arrived at the breathtaking
notion that sensibility is not confined to a living organism. Rather, it is a universal
property of matter; an inert property in brute bodies, like movement in heavy bodies
stopped by an obstacle; a property activated in the same bodies by their assimilation
with a living animal substance.62 This theme was developed in the Reveded'Alembert
of 1769, a work in which Diderot made Bordeu his mouthpiece. We have already seen
that Diderot had contact with various members ofthe Montpellier school, from whom
he commissioned many articles over the years for the Encyclop'die.'3 His use of
Bordeu, therefore, is a clear assertion that his own notions about sensibility were
rooted in the speculations ofthe Montpellier school.
D'Alembert's dream is preceded by a conversation, L'entretien entred'Alembert et
Diderot, in which the two men discuss the question ofhow apparently brute matter is
transformed into that which is living and active. D'Alembert is not convinced by
Diderot's theory of the universal sensibility of matter. The work opens with d'Alem-
bert, an exponent ofthe traditional view ofmatter, admitting that if, like the dualists,
one assigns an external motive force to a living body, one must admit to the existence
of a spiritual being that possesses contradictory properties. "I confess to a Being who
exists somewhere and yet corresponds to no point in space, a Being who, lacking
extension, yet occupies space, who is essentially different from matter and yet is one
with matter, who follows its motion and moves it, without himself being in motion,
who acts on matter and yet is subject to all its vicissitudes." But to reject the con-
tradictions is to move to Diderot's position, which is also fraught with problems, "for
ifthis faculty ofsensation, which you propose as a substitute, is a general and essential
" Diderot,'Pens6es sur l'interpretation de la nature', in Oeuvres complees, op. cit., note 58 above, vol. 2,
p. 770. Roger, op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 599-614. The work is also discussed in Wilson, op. cit., note 57
above, pp. 187-198.
"Diderot, 'Lettre de 15 octobre 1759 a Sophie Volland', in Oeuvres complkes, op. cit., note 58 above,
vol. 3, pp. 815-821. Quoted by Roger, op. cit., note 7 above, p. 617.
62 Diderot, 'Lettre de 10 octobre 1765 a Monsieur Duclos', in Oeuvres complees, op. cit., note 58 above,
vol. 5, pp. 949-952. Quoted by Roger, op. cit., note 7 above, p. 617.
63 Roger discusses the influence ofthe Montpellier physicians in the development of Diderot's philosophy
oflife in ibid., pp. 631-641.
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quality ofmatter, then a stone must be sensitive."64
If one acknowledges the existence of sensibility in that stone, then the process of
nourishment is understood as one whereby an organism removes obstacles which
mask the sensibility. It follows, therefore, that the animists, mechanists, and many
vitalists had all committed the same basic error ofassuming that life is imposed on to
matter such that its properties supersede and dominate the inorganic ones. The truth,
Diderot believed, is that life is not imposed but released. When you consume food, he
wrote, "you assimilate it, you turn it into flesh, you make it animal, you give it the
faculty ofsensation."65
Agitated by their conversation, d'Alembert later sleeps uneasily. While asleep, he
rambles on in a feverish vision which hovers around questions about the nature of
living matter, consciousness, and sensation. Called to attend to the apparently
delirious man, Bordeu establishes that d'Alembert's pulse and respiration are normal,
then settles down to assist Mlle de Lespinasse, d'Alembert's mistress, to extract the
implications that follow from the dreamer's visions. Their part in this drama is said to
have angered d'Alembert and Mlle de Lespinasse, but Bordeu's reaction is not
recorded. In any case, it is not overly difficult to imagine Bordeu expressing many of
the ideas Diderot presumed to attribute to him in this work.
Diderot has Bordeu explaining growth and the attendant acquisition of sensibility
as follows:
You begin as an imperceptible speck, formed from still smaller molecules scattered through the blood
and lymph of your father and mother; that speck becomes a loose thread, then a bundle of
threads.... Each ofthe fibres in the bundle ofthreads was transformed solely by nutrition and according
to its confirmation, into a particular organ.... The bundle is a purely sensitive system.... This pure and
simple sensitivity, this sense oftouch, is differentiated through the organs that arise from each separate
fibre; one fibre forming an ear, gives rise to a kind oftouch that we call a noise or a sound."
Consciousness is merely an organizational refinement of sensitivity confined to the
brain, which is the common centre ofall the sensations, as sight belongs to the eye and
hearing to the ear. With Bordeu's approval, Mlle de Lespinasse draws the appropriate
materialist conclusion which is that differences between human beings and animals
are finally only organizational. "Where the origin or trunk is too vigorous in relation
to the branches, you have poets, artists, imaginative people, cowards, fanatics,
madmen. When it is too weak, you get so-called brutes and savage beasts. Where the
whole system is slack and soft, without energy, you get imbeciles; where the whole
system is energetic, harmonious, well-disciplined, you get sound thinkers,
philosophers, sages."67
The visionary quality of Diderot's views is exciting if one is pleased with the notion
of a universe pulsating with ubiquitous vitality. Matter, it follows, is a panorama of
apparently inert but sensitive points conglomerating to form objects some of which
are living, conscious beings. Life is continuously emerging from its potential state so
that soil, stone, plants, and animals form an intricate and interconnected mass of
matter changing its form in such a way that neither birth nor death have any ultimate
64 Diderot, 'Le reveded'Alembert', in Oeuvres compltes, op. cit., note 58 above, vol. 8, p. 55.
61 Ibid., p. 58.
66 Ibid., pp. 104-105.
67 Ibid., pp. 134-135.
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meaning. As we have always known, everything returns sooner or later to the "great
inert sediment" from which it emerged. The R'eve is a masterpiece of materialistic
vitalism.lfone adopts Diderot's thesis, then it follows that the physician is not limited
to studying life exclusively with the tools of physics and chemistry. But neither is he
sent questing after the essence ofan ephemeral and elusive soul or vital principle.
Diderot had moved an immense distance from the iatromechanists whose notions
he dismissed as utter nonsense. Anyone who omits sensitivity, irritability, and
spontaneity from the calculation ofthe motion ofthe sensitive, animated, organized,
living beings, he wrote, does not know what he is doing.One day, he predicted, all
matter will be demonstrated to have six essential properties - attraction, length,
depth, breadth, impenetrability, and sensitivity. The Elements dephisiologie of 1776
was the last work in which Diderot addressed the questions surrounding life and con-
sciousness. His viewpoint remained essentially that which he assigned to Bordeu in the
Reve.
Much like La Mettrie, Diderot recognized the life force in a skinned, headless, but
still moving snake, in the quivering fragments of an eel, and in the contractions of a
pricked, excised heart." Bordeu had written that "the general life ... is the sum ofall
the particular lives."69 Diderot had been much influenced by Bordeu when he com-
mented that in the living organism, there are threedistinct levels oflife. These are "the
life of the entire animal", the "life of each of the organs", and "the life of the
molecule". They are inextricably intertwined in the body which they occupy. "The
heart, the lungs, the spleen ... nearly all the parts of the animal live for some time
separated from the whole. Even the head separated from the body sees, looks and
sees. It is only the life ofthe molecule, or its sensibility which does not cease at all. It is
one ofits essential qualities."70
Diderot's work is important because it incorporates the most progressive and
innovative ideas of his time. Many works, including the Reve and the ElIements de
phisiologie in which the notion of universal sensibility was explicitly expounded, were
not published until 1875. Nevertheless, the new physiology upon which they were
based suffused the Encyclopedie. It is important, finally, because it appears that until
such explicity materialist notions as those of La Mettrie and Diderot were developed,
there was virtually no way to avoid calling upon a spiritual, immaterial principle to
play some physiological role. Sensitive matter effectively stripped the soul of any
physiological functions.7'
After soaring along with Diderot's imagination it is anticlimatic to return to the
somewhat more pedestrian anatomically-based speculations of Bichat. Although
Bichat analysed sensibility and contractility and classified them into five distinct vital
forces, he had no concept of their universality in matter. Indeed, his definition of life
as "the collection ofthose forces which resist death" precluded such a possibility. His
6" Diderot, 'El6ments de phisiologie', in Oeuvres compktes, op. cit., note 58 above, vol. 13, pp. 661-662.
69 Bordeu, op. cit., note 29 above, pp. 829-831.
70 Diderot, op. cit., note 68 above, pp. 662-666.
7" Ibid., pp. 67-69. An extensive discussion ofthe connexion between Diderot's and La Mettrie's notions
is found in Vartanian, 'L'homme machine since 1748', in op. cit., note41 above, pp. 1 14-136.
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five forces included the consciously perceived sensibility and contractility described by
Haller and the unperceived ones which many persons assumed must occur at the level
of organs or even molecules. Most important of all, he insisted that all the vital
properties are fundamentally and absolutely different from physical ones.
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